TY - JOUR
T1 - The effect of discretionary spending on incumbent victories in elections
AU - Darmastuti, Dewi
AU - Setyaningrum, Dyah
N1 - Funding Information:
is supported by the audit results of the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK), wherein deviations of IDR 378 billion were found that were related to grants and social assistance in the Banten province budget of 2014-2015. The Centre for Budget Analysis (CBA) highlighted that the grant and social assistance spending of 17 provinces conducting elections in 2018 are considered vulnerable to such misuse. In addition, Indonesia Corruption Watch (2018) gave indications of the politicization of government programs, especially in the form of grants, social assistance, and financial assistance, particularly related to village funds.
Funding Information:
The data source for this study is from the General Elections Commission (KPU), the Director General of Regional Autonomy at the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Central Bureau of Statistics, and the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia’s Audit Report for 2013-2016. The sample selection process can be seen in Table 1.
Funding Information:
Notes: Grant (the average amount of grant expenditure divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); SocAssist (the average amount of social assistance spending divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); FinAssist (the average amount of financial assistance expenditure divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); Discspend (the average of the total amount of discretionary spending divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); Tspend (the average amount of log total of regional spending in the year leading up to the election); PAD (the average amount of the ratio of locally-generated revenue per total revenue in the year before the election); Efficiency (the average number of efficiency ratios ahead of the election); SiLPA (the average amount of the budget surplus divided by the total income of the year before the election).
Funding Information:
Notes: Grant (average amount of grant expenditure divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); SocAssist (average amount of social assistance spending divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); FinAssist (average amount of financial assistance expenditure divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); Discspend (average of the total amount of discretionary spending divided by total regional expenditure in the year leading up to the election); Tspend (average amount of log total of regional spending in the year leading up to the election); PAD (average amount of ratio of locally-generated revenue per total revenue in the year before the election);efficiency (average number of efficiency ratios ahead of the election); SiLPA (average amount of the budget surplus divided by the total income of the year before the election).
Publisher Copyright:
© Darmastuti and Setyaningrum
PY - 2019/7
Y1 - 2019/7
N2 - Purpose of the study: This study aims to investigate the opportunistic behavior of local government heads in Indonesia using discretionary spending (grant spending, social assistance, and financial assistance) to win an election. Methodology: The study uses logistic regression on 133 samples of district/municipal governments in Indonesia prior to the election period. Main findings: The study finds no evidence that the average proportion and growth of discretionary expenditure affects the electability of incumbents in Indonesia’s local government head elections. That is, the use of discretionary spending is not sufficiently effective to attract sympathy from voters. Applications of the study: The results of the study provide inputs, especially for incumbents, to help focus more on performance, as it is proven that it leads to a higher probability of being re-elected, rather than the use of discretionary spending as an election-winning strategy. Government and NGOs should inform voters to be more cautious about the opportunistic behavior of their leaders. Novelty/originality of the study: Although some previous studies have examined the use of discretionary spending by incumbents, there has been little research, which provides evidence that such spending for political purposes can in fact help to win elections.
AB - Purpose of the study: This study aims to investigate the opportunistic behavior of local government heads in Indonesia using discretionary spending (grant spending, social assistance, and financial assistance) to win an election. Methodology: The study uses logistic regression on 133 samples of district/municipal governments in Indonesia prior to the election period. Main findings: The study finds no evidence that the average proportion and growth of discretionary expenditure affects the electability of incumbents in Indonesia’s local government head elections. That is, the use of discretionary spending is not sufficiently effective to attract sympathy from voters. Applications of the study: The results of the study provide inputs, especially for incumbents, to help focus more on performance, as it is proven that it leads to a higher probability of being re-elected, rather than the use of discretionary spending as an election-winning strategy. Government and NGOs should inform voters to be more cautious about the opportunistic behavior of their leaders. Novelty/originality of the study: Although some previous studies have examined the use of discretionary spending by incumbents, there has been little research, which provides evidence that such spending for political purposes can in fact help to win elections.
KW - Discretionary Spending
KW - Grant
KW - Incumbent
KW - Re-election
KW - Social Assistance
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85075023353&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.18510/hssr.2019.7488
DO - 10.18510/hssr.2019.7488
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85075023353
SN - 2395-6518
VL - 7
SP - 685
EP - 693
JO - Humanities and Social Sciences Reviews
JF - Humanities and Social Sciences Reviews
IS - 4
ER -