Tax aggressiveness and sustainable welfare: the roles of corruption and tax allocation inefficiency

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Abstract

Purpose: This paper aims to investigate the roles of corruption and tax allocation inefficiency in moderating the effect of tax aggressiveness on sustainable welfare. Design/methodology/approach: This research uses a fixed-effect multiple regression analysis for 55,438 firm-year observations covering 22 countries from 2007 to 2017. Findings: For less (more) tax-aggressive observations, corruption and tax allocation inefficiency strengthen the negative (positive) effect of tax aggressiveness on sustainable welfare. The results are in line with public choice and functionalism theories that suggest that private investments can increase welfare when governments are dysfunctional. Practical implications: This paper shows that the effect of tax aggressiveness on sustainable welfare depends on tax aggressiveness, corruption and tax allocation inefficiency. Social implications: This paper implies that governments should reduce their corruption levels and increase tax allocation efficiency because private investments are ineffective in the long run. Originality/value: Because of increasing awareness of sustainability issue, sustainable welfare is considered more relevant than traditional welfare. Hence, empirical studies on the effect of tax aggressiveness on sustainable welfare are crucial. This paper adds the literature by combining public choice and functionalism theories to investigate the moderating roles of corruption and tax allocation inefficiency in this issue.

Original languageEnglish
JournalSocial Responsibility Journal
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2021

Keywords

  • Corruption
  • Cross-country
  • Sustainable welfare
  • Tax aggressiveness
  • Tax allocation inefficiency

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