TY - JOUR
T1 - Is there an ex-ante moral hazard on Indonesia’s health insurance? An impact analysis on household waste management behavior
AU - Gitaharie, Beta Yulianita
AU - Nasrudin, Rus'an
AU - Bonita, Ayu Putu Arantza
AU - Putri, Lovina Aisha Malika
AU - Rohman, Muhammad Abdul
AU - Handayani, Dwini
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Gitaharie et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
PY - 2022/12
Y1 - 2022/12
N2 - The presence of ex-ante moral hazard could undermine the potential gain from expanding health insurance coverage in developing nations. To test the proposition, this study utilizes a nationally representative longitudinal survey with Indonesia's health insurance for poor policy in 2014 as the quasi-experimental case study. The country represents developing nations that undergo a massive and rapid expansion of health insurance coverage. The empirical approach combines a matching and difference-in-differences method to obviate potential bias of the selectivity nature of health insurance provision and time-invariant unobserved factors. The findings suggest the presence of ex-ante moral hazard in the form of the less people using trash cans associated with the introduction of the subsidized health insurance premium. The results add empirical findings of a negative side effect of expanding health insurance coverage in developing nations.
AB - The presence of ex-ante moral hazard could undermine the potential gain from expanding health insurance coverage in developing nations. To test the proposition, this study utilizes a nationally representative longitudinal survey with Indonesia's health insurance for poor policy in 2014 as the quasi-experimental case study. The country represents developing nations that undergo a massive and rapid expansion of health insurance coverage. The empirical approach combines a matching and difference-in-differences method to obviate potential bias of the selectivity nature of health insurance provision and time-invariant unobserved factors. The findings suggest the presence of ex-ante moral hazard in the form of the less people using trash cans associated with the introduction of the subsidized health insurance premium. The results add empirical findings of a negative side effect of expanding health insurance coverage in developing nations.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85144174241
U2 - 10.1371/journal.pone.0276521
DO - 10.1371/journal.pone.0276521
M3 - Article
C2 - 36520868
AN - SCOPUS:85144174241
SN - 1932-6203
VL - 17
JO - PloS one
JF - PloS one
IS - 12 December
M1 - e0276521
ER -